Analysis of a Bias-Based Exception to the Doctrine of Exhaustion in Wilson v. Bull by McGrew, R. Mitchell
American Indian Law Review
Volume 39 | Number 2
2016
Analysis of a Bias-Based Exception to the Doctrine
of Exhaustion in Wilson v. Bull
R. Mitchell McGrew
University of Oklahoma College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
American Indian Law Review by an authorized administrator of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation







ANALYSIS OF A BIAS-BASED EXCEPTION TO THE 
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION IN WILSON V. BULL 
R. Mitchell McGrew* 
I. Introduction 
The jurisdictional reach of U.S. federal courts invokes a number of 
complicated questions and requires a delicate balancing act. Courts and 
legislators must weigh the guiding and limiting parameters of the 
Constitution as well as important policy considerations. The waters become 
even muddier when tribal concerns are involved. The courts are charged 
with the significant responsibility of maintaining the supremacy of the 
federal judiciary, but must be cautious not to hinder tribal sovereignty and 
self-determination. Indicative of this difficult balance is this question: 
When both the tribal courts and the federal courts can claim jurisdiction, 
can the parties choose which court to seek relief in? In an effort to protect 
the sovereignty of tribal courts and in the name of comity, the Supreme 
Court created the Doctrine of Exhaustion, requiring that tribal parties 
exhaust any available tribal court remedies before seeking redress in federal 
court.1 
Because the Doctrine of Exhaustion is a device intended to maintain 
fairness in the application of federal and tribal court jurisdiction, it has 
exceptions in place—safeguards to prevent abuse.2 In early 2014, a plaintiff 
seeking jurisdiction in federal district court sought to add another exception 
to the recognized list. Diane Wilson argued she was exempt from the 
                                                                                                                 
 * Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. See Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856–57 
(1985); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 
U.S. (1 Pet.) (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 2. See Nat’l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856 n.21 (“We do not suggest that exhaustion 
would be required where an assertion of tribal jurisdiction ‘is motivated by a desire to harass 
or is conducted in bad faith’. . . or where the action is patently violative of express 
jurisdictional prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an 
adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s jurisdiction.”) (quoting Juidice v. Vail, 430 
U.S. 327, 338 (1977)); see also Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 n.14 (1997) 
(“When . . . it is plain that no federal grant provides for tribal governance of nonmembers' 
conduct on land covered by Montana's main rule, it will be equally evident that tribal courts 
lack adjudicatory authority over disputes arising from such conduct.”). 
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exhaustion requirement because the tribal court was incapable of rendering 
an unbiased opinion in her suit against a tribally chartered college.3 
Following a rejection of her proffered theory of bias, the federal district 
court for the Western District of South Dakota dismissed her claim.4 
This case note examines the opinion given in Wilson v. Bull, and closely 
considers the merits of the new exception proposed by the plaintiff, 
compared against the policy behind the existing exceptions. On the facts of 
this particular case, the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the claim 
be dismissed was the right way to dispose of this action, and the trial court 
was correct in adopting the recommendation. However, Wilson’s proposed 
exception to the Doctrine of Exhaustion merits further inquiry, as it may 
serve another purpose in line with the policy of the existing exceptions.  
Ultimately, an exception to the Doctrine of Exhaustion for potential 
tribal bias is not an altogether unwise proposal. However, as a tribal 
member, Wilson was not the proper plaintiff for this exception. Wilson’s 
contention that she—a tribal member—would be deprived of a fair trial 
because of the tribal court’s supposed bias cannot be supported because 
such a position would destroy any legitimacy that tribal courts have long 
struggled for.  Even so, it is worth exploring whether this exception would 
be prudent in the narrow circumstances when a non-tribal member plaintiff 
seeks judicial relief from a tribally chartered entity, such as the Oglala 
Lakota College, for conduct occurring off the reservation. In such cases, 
there may be a reasonable concern that a tribal court could be incapable of 
adjudicating the matter without bias toward a defendant which draws 
revenue for the tribe. While this proposal still carries some troubling 
implications, it bears further exploration.  
II. The Law Before the Case 
A. Development of the Doctrine of Exhaustion 
The Doctrine of Exhaustion requires a party to a tribal court case to 
exhaust all tribal court remedies before the party can challenge the tribal 
court’s jurisdiction in federal court. It was introduced by the Supreme Court 
in National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians.5 In 
National Farmers Union, the Court examined the rule from Oliphant v. 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Wilson v. Bull, No. CIV. 12-5078-JLV, 2014 WL 412328, at  *1 (W.D.S.D. Feb. 3, 
2014). 
 4. Id. at *2.  
 5. 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985). 
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Suquamish Indian Tribe6 stating tribal courts do not have criminal 
jurisdiction to punish non-Indians for offenses committed on an Indian 
reservation. However, the Court declined to apply this rule to civil actions.7 
The Court endorsed a requirement of tribal court exhaustion, stating that 
such a rule supports tribal self-determination, allows the full development 
of a record for federal appellate courts, and “encourage[s] tribal courts to 
explain to the parties the precise basis for accepting jurisdiction.”8 
Congress, as the Court said, is “committed to a policy of supporting tribal 
self-government and self-determination.”9 Justice Stevens continued, 
arguing that Congress’ policy regarding tribal self-government “favors a 
rule that will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the 
first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for the challenge.”10 
The Court held that if the tribal courts have jurisdiction over an action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331,11 “exhaustion [of tribal remedies] is required” 
before such claims might be entertained by federal courts.12 
The Doctrine of Exhaustion was developed further in 1987, in Iowa 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. La Plante.13 Iowa Mutual asked whether the 
holding in National Farmers Union could be applied in a diversity case 
over a non-Indian defendant.14 When members of the Blackfeet Indian 
Tribe in Iowa brought suit in Blackfeet tribal court against an Iowa 
insurance company, the defendants challenged the court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction and asserted the plaintiff failed to properly allege tribal court 
jurisdiction.15 The tribal court ruled against the defendant on both 
challenges and the defendant filed in federal district court for its 
interlocutory appeal.16 The district court then granted the Indian plaintiffs’ 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, applying precedent 
                                                                                                                 
 6. 35 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 7. Nat’l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 853-54. 
 8. Id. at 856-57. 
 9. Id. at 856. 
 10. Id.  
 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). The 
Court in National Farmers Union noted that the district court was correct in “conclud[ing] 
that a federal court may determine under § 1331 whether a tribal court has exceeded the 
lawful limits of its jurisdiction.” Nat’l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 853.  
 12. Nat’l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 857. 
 13. 480 U.S. 9 (1987). 
 14. Id. at 13-14. 
 15. Id. at 11-12. 
 16. Id. at 12-13. 
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that the tribal court must be given an opportunity to determine its own 
jurisdiction,17 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.18 The Supreme Court 
determined that the National Farmers Union rule applied. Even in diversity 
cases, parties must exhaust tribal court remedies before seeking 
adjudication in federal court.19 The lasting rule from Iowa Mutual is that the 
exhaustion of tribal court remedies is required “regardless of the basis for 
jurisdiction.”20 The Court described the Doctrine of Exhaustion as 
necessary as a matter of comity,21 or “the recognition which one nation 
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of 
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and 
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens.”22   
B. Exceptions to the Doctrine of Exhaustion 
The Supreme Court has recognized four exceptions to the Doctrine of 
Exhaustion. The first three arise from National Farmers Union. Exhaustion 
is not required if “assertion of tribal court jurisdiction” meets one of three 
exceptions: first, when it “is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted 
in bad faith”; second, “where the action is patently violative of express 
jurisdictional prohibitions”; and lastly, “where exhaustion would be futile 
because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s 
jurisdiction.”23 The Court later created a fourth exception, which applies 
specifically to the Montana rule that “Indian tribes lack civil authority over 
the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian fee land within a reservation”24 
unless one of two narrow exceptions is met. This fourth exception exempts 
parties from the exhaustion requirement when “‘it is plain that no federal 
grant provides for tribal governance of nonmembers’ conduct on land 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Id. at 13. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. at 19-20. 
 20. Id. at 16.  
 21. Id. at 15. 
 22. Carey Austin Holliday, Note, Denying Sovereignty: The Louisiana Supreme Court’s 
Rejection of the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, 71 LA. L. REV. 1339, 1341 (2011) (quoting 
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895)). 
 23. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 n.21 
(1985). 
 24. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647 (2001). 
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covered by Montana’s main rule’25 so the exhaustion requirement would 
‘serve no purpose other than delay.’”26 
C. Application of the Exhaustion Doctrine 
Since National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual, the Supreme Court has 
reexamined the Doctrine of Exhaustion several times, and continually 
supports it. For example, the Court has considered whether petitioners were 
required to exhaust their tribal court claims in Nevada v. Hicks.27 In Hicks, 
the respondent claimed that a state game warden’s search of his home 
exceeded the bounds of the warrant and he sued in tribal court.28 After the 
tribal court held that its jurisdiction was proper, the petitioner sought 
declaratory judgment in federal district court that the tribal court lacked 
jurisdiction.29 Not only did the district court rule against the petitioner, it 
also held that the state officials would have to exhaust any claims of 
qualified immunity in tribal court. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court 
held that because tribal courts lack jurisdiction over state officials for 
causes of action relating to their performance of official duties, exhaustion 
was not required because there it would serve only to delay the 
proceedings.   
Federal circuit courts of appeals inform well on the application of the 
Exhaustion Doctrine. In analyzing the Doctrine of Exhaustion further, the 
First Circuit found in Ninigret Development Corp. v. Narrangansett Indian 
Wetuomuck Housing Authority that “the tribal exhaustion doctrine holds 
that when a colorable claim of tribal court jurisdiction has been asserted, a 
federal court may (and ordinarily should) give the tribal court 
precedence . . . .”30 The First Circuit found the Exhaustion Doctrine rests 
upon three “pillars.”31 The first pillar is Congress’ “policy of supporting 
tribal self-government and self-determination.”32 The second is that 
exhaustion fosters administrative efficiency,33 and the third pillar is that 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
 26. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369 (2001) (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 
U.S. 438, 459 n.14 (1997)). 
 27. 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
 28. Id. at 356. 
 29. Id. at 357. 
 30. Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narrangansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 
31 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. (quoting Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 
856-57 (1985)). 
 33. Id.  
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exhaustion “provides other decision makers with the benefit of tribal courts’ 
expertise, thus facilitating further judicial review.”34 These three cases serve 
to represent that since its inception, the Doctrine has been supported and 
praised as the best way to reconcile federal and tribal jurisdictional 
concerns.  
III. Statement of the Case: Wilson v. Bull 
A. Facts 
Diane Wilson is a member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe. In November 
2008, she was hired as a teaching assistant for Oglala Lakota College’s 
“Wanblee Head Start” children’s program and was subsequently employed 
through year-to-year contracts.35 The Oglala Lakota College (OLC) is a 
tribally chartered organization.36 In April 2009, OLC reprimanded Wilson 
based on an allegation that she mistreated a child in the program. The 
specific allegations of her conduct are not listed in the opinion. It warned 
her that another incident could result in her termination.37 After another 
child-mistreatment allegation surfaced in November 2009, Wilson’s 
employment with OLC was terminated.38 Wilson claimed this second 
allegation was false and asked OLC to reinstate her job or buy out the 
remainder of her contract.39 However, OLC upheld her termination after an 
informal grievance meeting.40 Wilson then requested a “formal full board 
hearing” in front of the OLC’s Board of Trustees, but this was denied 
because the request was untimely.41 OLC’s policy required Wilson to 
submit a written request within five business days of the informal grievance 
meeting, and she missed this deadline.42 Wilson, acting pro se, filed a 
wrongful termination suit in federal court in October 2012, demanding 
compensatory and punitive damages.43 She asserted federal question 
jurisdiction, pleading claims based on the Fort Laramie Treaty, the 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id.  
 35. Wilson v. Bull, No. CIV. 12-5078-JLV, 2014 WL 412328, at *2 (W.D.S.D. Feb 3, 
2014). 
 36. Id. at *3. 
 37. Id. at *2. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at *2-3. 
 42. Id. at *3. 
 43. Id. 
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Administrative Procedures Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment.44 The two 
named defendants in the suit were Thomas Short Bull, the President of 
OLC, and Michelle Yankton, the Director of OLC’s Head Start program.45  
B. Holding 
The defendants moved to dismiss the case without prejudice in part46 
because Wilson failed to exhaust her tribal remedies, instead initiating her 
complaint in federal court.47 The court sought the recommendation of U.S. 
Magistrate Judge Veronica L. Duffy, who advised the court to grant the 
defendants’ motion and dismiss the case for Wilson’s failure to exhaust her 
tribal remedies.48 Judge Duffy noted Wilson’s concerns about tribal court 
bias “because of their connections to OLC,” but explained this allegation 
does not fit within any existing exceptions to the Exhaustion Doctrine.49 
The district court adopted Judge Duffy’s recommendation in full, and 
dismissed Wilson’s complaint without prejudice.50 
The district court was not swayed by Wilson’s other argument that she 
should be exempt from the Doctrine of Exhaustion because “the tribal court 
will not be impartial to [her] case due to [its] loyalty to OLC College.”51 
The district court rejected this because the alleged impartiality of the tribal 
courts is not one of the recognized exceptions to the Doctrine of 
Exhaustion.52 Judge Duffy noted that requiring Wilson to exhaust tribal 
remedies was particularly just in this case—even more just than in National 
Farmers Union or Iowa Mutual because those cases involved suits against a 
non-member party, whereas Wilson’s case was a dispute between a tribal 
member and a tribally chartered organization.53 
Wilson made no claim that she did, in fact, exhaust her tribal remedies,54 
nor did she argue that the facts of this case fit within one of the previously 
existing exceptions. The function of Wilson’s argument was to suggest that 
a new exception to the exhaustion requirement be adopted: a party need not 
exhaust her tribal remedies when the tribal court is unable to render an 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at *2-3. 
 46. The defendants also requested dismissal on the merits of the case. Id. at *5. 
 47. Id. at *3. 
 48. Id. at *1. 
 49. Id. at *5.  
 50. Id. at *2. 
 51. Id. at *1. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at *3. 
 54. Id. at *1. 
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impartial opinion because of bias toward a party.55 Because trial courts are 
typically bound to operate within existing statutory and common law, 
leaving the creation of new law to appellate courts and legislators, the trial 
court refused to create a new exception. 
As a procedural matter, it is important to note that Wilson’s claim was 
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds without prejudice.56 If Wilson seeks 
redress through tribal sources and is truly subject to the kind of bias she 
claims exists, then she will have the opportunity to bring her action in 
federal court again. In this circumstance, her claim would likely survive a 
jurisdictional challenge because she has exhausted her tribal court remedies. 
Furthermore, she will have satisfied the first exception to the Exhaustion 
Doctrine, which states a claimant need not exhaust tribal remedies if the 
assertion of tribal jurisdiction “is motivated by a desire to harass or is 
conducted in bad faith.”57   
IV. Analysis 
A. Why Diane Wilson Was Not the Proper Plaintiff to Propose a Bias-
Based Exception 
Because the Doctrine of Exhaustion is based on a “policy of supporting 
tribal self-government and self-determination, and because it is prudential 
rather than jurisdictional,”58 any exceptions also serve to impose limitations 
upon tribal self-government and self-determination. Considering those 
implications, suggestions to expand the list of exceptions should be viewed 
closely and with utmost skepticism, as should any attempt to limit tribal 
autonomy. Even assuming that the exhaustion requirement can be bypassed 
with a showing the tribal court is unable to render an impartial opinion, 
Judge Duffy and the district court correctly decided this case.  
Requiring exhaustion of tribal court remedies was particularly proper in 
this case because it involved a dispute between two tribal parties: a tribal 
member and a tribally chartered organization. “The facts in this case 
support requiring exhaustion of tribal remedies even more compellingly 
than did the facts in National Farmers Union and LaPlante” because “here, 
the issue is whether a tribe has jurisdiction over a dispute between a 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at *2. 
 57. Nat’l Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 n.21 (1985). 
 58. Gaming World Int’l v. White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians, 317 F. 3d 840, 849 
(8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Nat’l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856). 
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member and a tribally chartered organization.”59 The Supreme Court cases 
giving rise to the Doctrine of Exhaustion and its exceptions involved suits 
against non-members, and even then the Court upheld the exhaustion 
requirement.60 If Wilson had been successful in avoiding tribal court on the 
grounds that the court’s loyalty to OLC would deprive her of impartial 
adjudication, the damage to the doctrines of tribal legitimacy would be 
substantial. The question then becomes quite harrowing: If tribal courts 
cannot try cases between two tribal parties, then who falls under their 
jurisdiction? Instead, any discussion of whether the alleged impartiality of a 
tribal court constitutes a just exception to the Exhaustion Doctrine must be 
based on jurisdiction over non-members. There is no viable way to grant 
tribal members this exception without severely injuring the independence of 
tribal courts to deal with disputes between their members and tribally 
chartered organizations. The adoption of this exception for tribal members 
would allow for the circumvention of tribal courts whenever convenient, 
rendering their jurisdiction toothless.  
However, Wilson’s failed argument raises an interesting question about 
the merits of attaching a new exception to the Exhaustion Doctrine. Why 
not adopt a new exception for a narrow factual situation when the tribal 
courts could not even be expected to operate impartially? What if the 
plaintiff was a non-Indian and the defendant, similarly to Oglala Lakota 
College, was a tribally chartered organization that brought in revenue for 
the tribe?  
B. The Policy Behind the Existing Exceptions  
As previously noted, there are currently four recognized exceptions to 
the Doctrine of Exhaustion: exhaustion of tribal remedies 
is not required (1) where “assertion of tribal jurisdiction is 
motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith”; (2) 
where the action is “patently violative of express judicial 
prohibitions”; (3) “where exhaustion would be futile because of 
the lack of adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s 
jurisdiction”; and (4) “[w]hen . . . it is plain that no federal grant 
provides for tribal governance of nonmembers’ conduct on land 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Wilson, 2014 WL 412328, at *5. 
 60. See Nat’l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. 845; Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 
(1987). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
626 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
 
 
covered by Montana’s main rule, so the exhaustion requirement 
would serve no purpose other than delay.”61 
Each of these exceptions arises out of policy concerns involving simple 
notions of fairness, equity, and good faith. None imply the federal courts 
are superior to, or more capable of impartial justice than tribal courts.  
An exception allowing an Indian plaintiff to circumvent tribal court 
jurisdiction based on court bias toward tribally chartered organization 
defendants would be incongruous with the policies underlying the four 
recognized exceptions. Wilson’s argument62 suggests that federal courts are 
more capable of rendering impartial judgments than tribal courts. Whether 
this assertion is valid is irrelevant when considering a possible bias 
exception. A bias exception implies a point the other exceptions reject: 
tribal courts are incompetent.  
C. The Supreme Court Weighs in on Alleged Incompetence of Tribal Courts 
The Supreme Court has looked at the competence of tribal courts, and 
rejected an exemption from tribal court jurisdiction based on incompetence, 
protecting tribal courts’ place as the “appropriate forums for the exclusive 
adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests 
of both Indians and non-Indians.”63 The petitioner in Iowa Mutual also 
sought to avoid tribal court jurisdiction, arguing that local bias and 
incompetence justified exemption.64 The Court reiterated that alleged 
incompetence is not one of the recognized exceptions, and that it would be 
“contrary to the congressional policy promoting the development of tribal 
courts.”65 The Supreme Court will not suggest that tribal courts are 
incompetent, and it will not grant relief to parties that can only forward a 
fear of tribal court incompetence. 
D. Conflicts of Interest or Incompetence?  
There is a key difference between extending the proposed exception to 
Wilson and extending it to a non-Indian plaintiff: allowing Indian plaintiffs 
to bypass tribal court jurisdiction because of bias implies tribal courts are 
incapable of fairly adjudicating matters. The use of such an exception for 
non-Indian plaintiffs suing tribally chartered organizations carries a 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Wilson, 2014 WL 412328, at *1 (quoting Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369 
(2001)). 
 62. Id. at *5.  
 63. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978). 
 64. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 18-19. 
 65. Id.  
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different implication, which although problematic, is less troubling than 
that of tribal court incompetence. An exception for non-Indian plaintiffs 
against tribally chartered organization defendants suggests not that tribal 
courts are unable to oversee matters fairly, but that they could be unwilling 
to do so when the defendant is a source of revenue for the tribe.  
It is crucial to draw distinctions between this suggestion and other very 
common situations. In the context of state and federal government, suits are 
frequently brought involving governmental entities that draw revenue for 
the government, like a state tax commission. It might be said that the 
rationale behind a bias-based exception would extend to this arena, 
suggesting that a private entity could not have a fair trial in federal court 
against the Internal Revenue Service. However, just as the bias-based 
exception would not apply when a tribal member brings suit against a 
source of tribal revenue, such concerns would not need to be addressed here 
because the private citizen or entity has subjected himself to the jurisdiction 
of the United States courts by simply being a citizen or domestic entity. The 
bias-based exemption would apply in situations where a non-tribal member 
ends up in tribal court, due not to his or her citizenship, but by activity.  
It can be argued that a bias-based exception already exists within the 
Doctrine of Exhaustion, as an example of harassment or bad faith. It is true 
that a party that can actually demonstrate an act or pattern of bias in the 
tribal courts could likely achieve this exception. The proposed new 
exception, however, would allow for parties to overcome the exhaustion 
requirement without an actual showing of such bias. In the specific posture 
this note suggests, when a non-tribal member brings a claim against a 
source of tribal revenue, there could be a presumption that exhaustion is 
unnecessary, allowing proceedings to move forward in federal court 
without the delay for a party to make a showing of harassment or bad faith.  
To be clear, this is not intended to imply that tribal courts are corrupt. 
This would be a far more serious accusation. Instead, it means to illustrate a 
clear conflict of interest that arises when a non-Indian party must submit to 
tribal court jurisdiction when suing a tribally chartered organization. The 
non-Indian plaintiff is at the unique disadvantage of litigating in an 
unfamiliar court, and may incur substantial costs before they can question 
tribal court jurisdiction.66 It seems unjust to require the plaintiff to argue in 
front of a court whose financial interests are tied to the defendant. 
                                                                                                                 
 66. James D. Griffith, Understanding the Tribal Court Exhaustion Doctrine, J.D. 
GRIFFITH LAW (Oct. 7, 2013), https://jdgriffithlaw.wordpress.com/2013/10/07/tribal-ct-
exhaustion-doctrine/. 
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E. Bias-Based Exception as a Method of Tribal Court Recusal  
With respect to the conflict of interest concern, the proposed bias-based 
exception could operate as a method of tribal court recusal, just as justices 
and judges are expected to recuse themselves in matters where their 
impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.”67 Title 28 U.S.C. § 455 
outlines specific situations where a judge’s impartiality is so questionable 
that the judge must recuse himself, including personal bias or prejudices,68 
having served as a private practice or government lawyer in the matter at 
hand,69 having a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy,70 or 
having an otherwise close relationship to any party, lawyer, material 
witness, or person who would be substantially affected by the case’s 
outcome.71 
While tribal judges are not bound by § 455, the code serves as support 
for the proposition that it is wise for tribal courts to refrain from overseeing 
cases involving a tribally chartered organization that brings in money for 
the tribe. Such circumstances are analogous to § 455(b)(4), which requires 
recusal when the judge’s financial interests are involved.  
The American Bar Association requires lawyers similarly to avoid 
conflicts of interest.72 Lawyers are expected to decline to represent certain 
clients if the representation would adversely affect another client.73 They 
are also prohibited from acquiring any sort of financial interest adverse to 
their clients.74 As judges and lawyers are expected to avoid any potential 
conflicts of interest, should we not similarly expect tribal courts to recuse 
themselves when the tribal government has a financial interest in the case’s 
outcome? 
F. The Need for Greater Federal Oversight 
After examining tribal court decisions after the inception of the 
Exhaustion Doctrine, Judith V. Royster has suggested that as tribal courts 
are vested with increasing sovereignty, “the more need there seems to be 
                                                                                                                 
 67. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012).  
 68. Id. § 455(b)(1). 
 69. Id. § 455(b)(2)-(3). 
 70. Id. § 455(b)(4). 
 71. Id. § 455(b)(5). 
 72. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7. 
 73. Id. 
 74. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8. 
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for increasing federal scrutiny.”75 Without such scrutiny, tribal exhaustion 
would mean little other than “delay and additional expense for the 
litigants.”76 While neither Royster nor this note mean to suggest that each 
tribal court decision ought to be presumed in error, Royster illustrates the 
point that the federal government can do more to ensure that tribal 
jurisdiction is not over-asserted to the detriment of non-Indian parties.   
Royster’s analysis supports the proposed exception in another way. In 
studying federal post-exhaustion review cases, Royster determined that 
although the federal courts review tribal determinations of federal law de 
novo, they accord “total deference” to tribal court determinations of tribal 
law.77 This finding alone is not troubling, as one would expect federal 
courts to defer to tribal courts in interpreting tribal law. However, with little 
to no possibility of a federal court reversing a tribal court’s determination 
on tribal law, it should not be easy to exercise tribal jurisdiction over a non-
Indian plaintiff suing a tribally chartered organization. The primary concern 
here is that non-tribal members, with perhaps only the most incidental 
contact with a tribe, could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a foreign court 
with little actual recourse from the federal courts.  
G. Williams v. Lee Distinguished  
Opponents to this proposed exception may cite Williams v. Lee, where 
the Supreme Court reversed the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling that 
Arizona state courts had jurisdiction over suits by non-Indians against 
Indians, even if the action arose on an Indian reservation.78 In Williams, the 
plaintiff was a non-Indian who ran a general store located on the Navajo 
Indian Reservation in Arizona. He sued a Navajo Indian married couple 
who lived on the reservation to collect on an outstanding debt. Drawing 
inspiration from John Marshall,79 Justice Black held that to allow the 
exercise of state jurisdiction would “undermine the authority of the tribal 
courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe upon the right of 
Indians to govern themselves.”80 It was irrelevant to the Court that the 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Judith V. Royster, Stature and Scrutiny: Post-Exhaustion Review of Tribal Court 
Decisions, 46 U. KAN. L. REV.  241, 241 (1998). 
 76. Id. at 245. 
 77. Id. at 281. 
 78. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218 (1959). 
 79. Id. at 218-19 (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)). 
 80. Id. at 223. 
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plaintiff was non-Indian because his business and the matter in controversy 
took place on an Indian reservation.81 
Certainly Justice Black’s powerful defense of tribal jurisdiction could 
serve as a strong argument against an exception for non-Indian plaintiffs 
suing tribally chartered organizations. However, the proposed exception is 
narrowly tailored so that none of the primary concerns the Court discusses 
in Williams are implicated. The suggested exception would differ from the 
Williams facts in two main ways. First, the exception would apply not to all 
Indian defendants such as those in Williams,82 but only to tribally chartered 
organizations that serve as a revenue stream for the tribe. If the Indian 
defendant were not a source of tribal revenue, then the previously discussed 
conflicts of interest would not be at issue.  
Second, such an exception would not apply if the matter in controversy 
took place on an Indian reservation. Justice Black recognizes in Williams 
that “the cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of 
Indian governments over their reservations.”83 The bias exception would 
thus only apply when the matter in controversy does not occur on an Indian 
reservation. 
H. The Addition of New Exceptions to the Doctrine of Exhaustion May Be 
Appropriate 
It is worth considering if there are any other grounds upon which another 
exception to the Doctrine of Exhaustion may be warranted. Any in-depth 
consideration of the particular merits or weaknesses of any other exceptions 
are beyond the scope of this note, but it is necessary to recognize that the 
existing list may be incomplete.  
Consider, for example, an exception to the Doctrine of Exhaustion for 
Indian and non-Indian claimants seeking federal subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in a claim against a tribal party.84 Would an 
exception for parties seeking diversity jurisdiction under § 1332 be 
prudent,85 an idea that was previously rejected by the Supreme Court?86 
These rules act to confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts for matters that 
are better suited the federal courts than the state courts. It is worth exploring 
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 84. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). 
 85. Id. § 1332.  
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whether the tribal courts are analogous to state courts in this regard. If so, 
then perhaps an exception to the Doctrine of Exhaustion for federal subject 
matter jurisdiction under §§ 1331 and 1332 is worth examining.  
V. Conclusion 
To protect important tribal interests in self-governance and self-
determination, the Supreme Court has allowed the Indian tribes to 
adjudicate internally matters involving tribal members. This goal gave rise 
to the Doctrine of Exhaustion and its narrow exceptions. Even in cases like 
National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual, where only one party was a 
tribal member or organization, the Court would not recognize potential bias 
against the non-Indian party as an excuse to duck the exhaustion 
requirement.87 Likewise, Wilson could not have prevailed on her argument 
for a bias-based exception in her claim, especially because both parties to 
the case were affiliated with the same tribe.88 If the Supreme Court rejected 
a bias exception when only one party was affiliated with a tribe, as Judge 
Duffy pointed out, it is extremely unlikely that bias would be a valid 
exception in claims involving two Indian parties.89  
Wilson’s proposed exception was rightfully rejected by the trial court 
and should be continually rejected on appeal. It operates under the inherent 
assumption that federal district courts are more competent than tribal 
courts. The recognized exceptions allow for original jurisdiction in federal 
court for reasons of good faith and fairness, not out of a presumption that 
the tribal courts are ill-equipped to rule on cases between their own tribal 
members. Wilson’s case illustrates how even though the bias-based 
exception cannot be adopted as a bright line rule, there are existing case-by-
case avenues through which a claimant can obtain a just ruling regardless of 
any in-practice biases. 
However, it may be wise to adopt a new, narrow exception to the 
Doctrine of Exhaustion allowing non-Indian claimants to sue tribally 
chartered entities in federal court without first exhausting tribal court 
remedies. While this proposed exception does assume the possibility of 
tribal bias, it is not rooted in incompetence. Rather, it is based in genuine 
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conflicts of interest issues that the American judiciary and legal profession 
have long sought to avoid.90 
As the body of jurisprudence on the Doctrine of Exhaustion develops, 
courts should be open to considering new exceptions to the doctrine when 
justice so requires. However, such exceptions cannot be founded upon a 
lack of confidence in the tribal courts to adjudicate tribal matters. An 
exception for non-Indian plaintiffs suing tribally chartered organizations 
could serve to protect the interests of these plaintiffs to avoid impartial 
courts while not causing irrevocable damage to tribal sovereignty.  
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